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action the defendant claimed that Section 271 (d) now abrogated
this finding. The court properly held that this section did not change
the law with regard to patent misuse in violation of the anti-trust
laws, and regardless of what change may have been effected, the de-
fendant was not otherwise entitled to relief under the meaning of
Section 271 (d).
Can it be possible that Congress intended, by paragraph (d), to give a
patentee a protection superior to the broad public policy of the Sherman
Act ... ?35
CONCLUSION
There has been no decision by the United States Supreme Court
as to whether or not Section 271 has changed the doctrine of the
Mercoid case, and few of the lower courts have squarely faced the
problem. Those courts that have so faced this problem have taken
the words to indicate dearly the intention of Congress to overrule
the holding and dicta of the Mercoid case, in so far as this section
applies. In view of the wording of this section and the few cases
decided so far, there is little doubt that the courts will continue to
construe this section as overruling the Mercoid decision that filing a
suit is patent misuse. In regard to furnishing a component that is
not a staple of commerce suitable for a non-infringing use, the lower
courts and the Supreme Court will undoubtedly follow the few courts
that have held this action to be contributory infringement. This is
the import and natural construction of Section 271.
WILLIAM N. HOGG
Contributory Negligence-The Dwindling Defense
Jones is driving north on Broad Street. As he comes to Main
Street, he pulls into the left lane, prepares to turn left, and as he is
turning sees an automobile driving south bearing down on him at
sixty-five to seventy miles an hour. Before he can complete his turn,
the oncoming car, now with its brakes on, skids into the side of Jones'
car.
Subsequently a passenger in the other vehicle brings suit against
Jones for injuries sustained in the accident, the theory being that he
was negligent in turning left without ascertaining whether the way
was clear. When the deposition of the plaintiff-passenger is taken,
it turns out that she saw Jones' vehicle turning left, but said nothing
to the driver, even though her driver was not slowing down. Further,
she testifies that she knew the speed limit was thirty-five miles per
hour on that road and that the driver had been traveling at this high
35. 134 F. Supp. 69, 72 (D.D.C. 1955).
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rate of speed for over a mile, but she had said nothing by way of pro-
test. Upon learning of this, it seems to Jones that part of the "fault"
for the accident rests with the plaintiff-passenger; therefore he asks
his attorney what "the law" is in this respect.' It is the purpose of
this note to examine the duty devolving upon such a passenger in
Ohio.
A PASSENGER MUST USE ORDINARY CARE
A statement of the rule concerning passengers, unobjectionable in
any quarters, is that:
It is the duty of a guest or private passenger in another's automobile
... to exercise ordinary care to guard himself against injury from the
hazards of the Toad.2
A guest or passenger in an automobile may rely to a reasonable extent
on the exercise of due care by the driver....3
The problem of what constitutes "ordinary care," an enigma through-
out tort law, becomes especially difficult in cases involving automo-
bile passengers.
In any discussion of the defense of contributory negligence con-
sideration must be given to the type of conduct which fulfills ". . . the
duty . . . to exercise ordinary care. . . ." Investigation of the cases
involving the use of this defense discloses a growing reluctance on
the part of the courts to submit the defense to the jury, the justifica-
tion being that there was no duty on the part of the passenger to act
under the circumstances.4 The net effect is that in many cases the
defense of contributory negligence is completely removed from the
case, when such a result would not be obvious to many attorneys.
In cases where a car suddenly swerves over the center line, or sud-
denly pulls out from a side street, colliding with the carefully driven
car in which the plaintiff was a passenger, most courts and writers
are in agreement that there is no question of contributory negligence
to go to the jury, since the accident could not have been avoided by
a warning on the part of the passenger.5 This view seems entirely
justifiable.
However, in a situation where the conduct of plaintiff's driver
could have been a factor in causing the accident, the decision that
there was no contributory negligence on the part of the passenger in
1. Although this is a hypothetical fact situation, it is one not uncommon to cases involving
the doctrine of contributory negligence.
2. 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTIcE pt. 1, § 2391, at 515
(1946).
3. Id. § 2392, at 527.
4. There is no duty in this situation, as opposed to other elements of negligence not being
present, such as proximate cause or damage.
5. Golamb v. Layton, 154 Ohio St. 305, 95 N.E.2d 681 (1950); accord, McCrate v. Morgan
Packing Co., 117 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1941).
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not protesting against the conduct is less justifiable. In one such case
the trial court held that, although the driver exceeded the speed limit,
there was no issue of contributory negligence for the jury, and the
decision was sustained on appeal.6 The appellate court cited with
approval Cleveland Ry. v. Heller,7 which held that an occupant had
no duty to keep remonstrating or instructing the driver how the ve-
hicle should be operated. Therefore, the fact that the plaintiff re-
mained silent, even though the driver was exceeding the speed limit,
was no evidence of contributory negligence.
A narrowing of the passenger's duty is also found in the case of
Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co.8 In that case a fuse had blown on the
defendant's truck, causing the lights to go out. The driver pulled
over to the side of the road, put a fuzee on the rear of the truck,
and was getting out his pot torches when the collision occurred. A
trucker traveling in the opposite direction, realizing the plight of the
defendant's driver, pulled his truck to the side of the road. Seeing a
car approaching the point where the defendant had pulled off the
road, the second trucker grabbed his flashlight, ran to the center of
the highway, and tried to wave down the approaching car in which
plaintiff's decedent was a passenger. The trucker also yelled as the
car passed. A few seconds later the collision occurred, killing the
plaintiff's decedent. The trial court submitted the issue of contribu-
tory negligence to the jury, which returned a verdict for the defend-
ant. The Supreme Court, however, held that since there was no evi-
dence that the plaintiff saw the warning signals or heard the truck-
er's cries, there was no evidence of contributory negligence merely
because the plaintiff did not speak, for, in the words of the court,
"there was no evidence of circumstances which would impose any
duty to do so." 9  The court went on to point out that the passenger
had a right to rely upon the driver to operate the vehicle properly,
and, until the passenger had knowledge of some unusual circumstance,
he had no duty to act."0
A similar result was reached in the case of Davis v. New York
Central R. R."- In this case Da -is, the decedent, was riding in a
pick-up truck driven by her husband. The fatal accident occurred
when the truck was hit by defendant's train as the truck crossed the
third of a four-track graded crossing. Evidence of objects and weeds
obstructing the view from the pick-up truck to the left as it crossed
6. Telling Belle Vernon Co. v. Krenz, 34 Ohio App. 499, 171 N.E. 357 (1928), motion to
certify denied, Jan. 23, 1929. The court mistakenly talked about joint enterprise and con-
tributory negligence in the same breath, saying that since there was no joint enterprise merely
because plaintiff was the wife of the driver, there could be no contributory negligence.
7. 15 Ohio App. 346 (1921), motion to certify denied, Feb. 7, 1922.
8. 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
9. Id. at 671-72, 67 N.E.2d at 859.
10. Id. at 670-71, 67 N.E.2d at 858.
11. 104 Ohio App. 497, 150 N.E.2d 477 (1957), motion to certify denied, June 19, 1957.
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the track was admitted, even though the train approached from the
right. It was alleged that this crossing was one of more than ordi-
nary danger, one factor being that the tracks curved to the right, so
that the railroad should have had extra warning devices. It should
be noted that the decedent in this case lived only six hundred feet
from the crossing and traversed this same path quite frequently. The
trial court submitted to the jury the question of contributory negli-
gence on the part of the decedent. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff. The appellate court, in affirming this decision, said
"we have difficulty in finding any evidence upon which contributory
negligence is suggested."' 12 The court also approved a special charge
requested by the plaintiff that, "ordinarily, it is not the province or
even proper for a guest to interfere with the driver until she discov-
ers that the driver is unskillful, reckless, or has failed to perceive im-
pending danger.' '1 3
The contrary view of what constitutes the duty of the passenger
is found in the dissenting opinion in the Bush case. Chief Justice
Weygandt, in answering the majority opinion, followed the reasoning
of the trial court that:
A dangerous situation must have been made manifest to plaintiff's de-
cedent by Dennis [second trucker] waving his flashlight in the middle
of the road trying to flag the automobile -in which Bush [plaintiff's de-
cedent] was riding. Since Crigler's [the driver's] testimony shows that
Bush was awake and looking straight ahead the only fair inference that
could be drawn -is that Bush must have seen the flashlight signal.14
The dissenting opinion pointed out that not only was the danger made
manifest, and not only did the decedent remain silent, but the final
requirement for letting the question of contributory negligence go to
the jury was also met; that is, there was time for the passenger to act
so as to avoid the collision. 5
It should be noted that the Davis and Bush cases appear to stand
for the proposition that a passenger has no duty reasonably to ac-
quire knowledge of a dangerous situation. On the other hand, the
reasoning of the dissent in the Bush case seems to be that even if the
passenger did not see the flares, flashlight, or warning signals, he
should have seen them, or so a jury could reasonably have found.
The rationale of the oft repeated statement of the court that it
is not necessary for the plaintiff-passenger to "keep remonstrating or
interfering with the driver, or instructing the driver as to how the
12. Id. at 506, 150 N.E.2d at 484.
13. Id. at 503, 150 N.E.2d at 482; =ccord, Augusta v. Paradis, 61 Ohio App. 323, 22 N.E.2d
578 (1939); Smith v. Cushman Motor Delivery Co., 54 Ohio App. 99, 6 N.E.2d 594 (1936);
Metzger v. Yellow Taxicab Co., 48 Ohio App. 275, 193 N.E. 75 (1933).
14. Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 673-74, 67 N.E.2d 851, 859 (1946)
(dissenting opinion).
15. Id. at 675, 67 N.E.2d at 860 (dissenting opinion).
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machine shall be operated," is that "it is obvious that such interfer-
ence more often would result in injury than in its prevention .... -16
However, it seems clear that there is a difference between a pas-
senger exclaiming that there is an obstruction ahead, or that a car is
pulling out, and his continually telling the driver to shift gears, move
over to the left lane, or turn right because that way is faster. More
important, however, is the questionable conclusion that is drawn from
such protests or warnings on the part of the passenger - that "it is
obvious that such interference more often would result in injury than
in its prevention."' 1  One should not be misled by the use of the per-
suasive definition by characterizing such action as "interference."
The actions could, with equal justification, be termed "assistance,"
or "helpfulness."
The court in the Telling Belle case does not give any explanation
as to how or why such remarks would more often result in injury, and
the use of the phrase "it is obvious that . . ." perhaps suggests the
weakness of the argument and the difficulty in supporting the con-
clusion.
It would seem to be equally valid to argue that a suggestion that
the driver reduce his speed to the lawful limit would reduce the num-
ber of accidents and injuries. It is difficult to imagine exactly how a
comment on the excessive speed could in fact "more often result in
injury than in its prevention."'- The driver may not heed the advice
of the passenger and injury may not be prevented, but it seems very
dubious that the chance of injury would be increased; rather, it would
seem that in some cases the driver would reduce his speed and an
accident would be avoided.
The case for requiring the passenger to mention to the driver
dangers which he perceives would seem to be even stronger. Every-
one who has driven is aware of the fact that with the number of cars
on the crowded highways today, it is extremely difficult to be aware
of everything that takes place on the road. While the driver is look-
ing in the rear-vision mirror, a car might pull out from a side street
on the right side of the road, or a car previously parked might pull
away from the curb and into the driving lane. In such a case is it
really more probable that the mention of this danger by the passenger
will increase the risk of injury, or is it more probable that it will de-
crease this risk? The passenger's exclamation may not have any ef-
fect on the result. But there is a reasonable possibility that such
warning will avert an accident, and it is virtually impossible to imag-
ine how it would increase the likelihood of an accident. This being
the case, it seems that it is time to re-examine the philosophy under-
16. Telling Belle Vernon Co. v. Krenz, 34 Ohio App. 499, 505, 171 N.E. 357, 359 (1928);
accord, Cleveland Ry. v. Heller, 15 Ohio App. 346 (1921).
17. Telling Belle Vernon Co. v. Krenz, supra note 16, at 505, 171 N.E. at 359.
18. Ibid. This case involved excessive speed.
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lying the concept that there is no affirmative duty to protest against
excessive speed or to warn the driver of impending dangers.
When the court says that a word of protest or warning on the
part of the passenger would only increase the probability of resulting
injuries, it not only is ignoring reality, but very often the court is also
invading the province of the jury. The role of the jury is to deter-
mine first, what the facts are - that is, what portion of the entire
evidence they believe to be true - and second, whether, under the
judge's instructions as to "the law," the facts reveal a failure to meet
the standard of care imposed upon the party so charged. While
some cases will justify a court's withholding from the jury the ques-
tion of contributory negligence, it is submitted that in situations such
as the Bush and Davis cases, reasonable minds could differ as to the
facts and as to whether a warning or protest by the plaintiff could
in fact have averted the accident. This being the case, is it proper
for the court to take the issue of contributory negligence from the
jury on the basis of the court's determination of the fact that such an
exclamation could not have altered the course of events?
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In view of the limitations imposed upon the submission to the
jury of the question of the passenger's contributory negligence, the
following vital question arises: if there is evidence of contributory
negligence, under what instructions should the issue be submitted to
the jury?
At the outset, the problem revolves around the choice of what
could be termed a "strict" or a "liberal" charge. 9 Under the "strict"
charge, the court sets forth specific duties which are included in the
requirement of exercising ordinary care, or it can go further and set
forth specific acts, the non-performance of which would constitute
contributory negligence. The "liberal" charge, on the other hand,
states merely that the law requires the passenger to use ordinary care
under the circumstances, and then lets the jury decide both what con-
stitutes ordinary care under the circumstances, and whether the plain-
tiff failed to meet this standard.
The distinction can be better understood by looking at a specific
case. In Hocking Falley Ry. v. Wykle,2 ° the driver of the car in
which the plaintiff was a passenger approached a railroad crossing,
listened for a train, slowed down, and looked to the right. He
looked to the left as he crossed the tracks, saw a flash, and a gondola
19. Mechem, The Contributory Negligence of Automobile Passeogers, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 736
(1930), uses the terms "strict" and "dissenting" to distinguish the two types of charge. How-
ever, since the publication of that article many states have adopted what he refers to as the
"dissenting" rule. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to use the terms "strict" and "liberal"
today.
20. 122 Ohio St. 391, 171 N.E. 860 (1930).
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car backing up the tracks from the driver's left collided with the auto-
mobile. The defendant requested the trial court to use a "strict"
charge. The trial judge refused to instruct that
it was -the duty of the plaintiff to use ordinary care in the exercise of
his own facilities in looking and listening for a train as the automobile
approached the crossing ....
It was the plaintiff's duty to use his senses of sight and hearing to
avoid injury to himself when he was about -to go upon the grade
crossing, which is admittedly a -place of danger. The time to use these
senses for his own protection was just before going into the zone of
danger, and it was the plaintiffs duty to look and listen in such a manner
as would make the use of these senses effective.2'
The court in this case said that it was not error to refuse to sub-
mit this charge, because the charge went too far. The court went on
to say that while the passenger has the duty of ordinary care, and
cannot rely entirely upon the driver, the rule is that
it is a matter of common knowledge that under ordinary circum-
stances such occupants do largely rely upon the driver, who has the exclusive
control and management of the vehicle, exercising the required degree of
care, and for that reason courts are not justified in adopting a hard and
fast rule that they are guilty of negligence in doing so.22
Thus, it was held that the court should instruct that there is a general
duty to use due care and that the passenger cannot rely entirely upon
the driver, and no more. To go further in instructing the jury on
the duty of the passenger would be error.a
The Davis case 24 again provides an example of the "liberal" in-
struction. The trial court charged:
A passenger is required to use her faculties of sight and hearing for
her own protection and at a railroad crossing is required to exercise that
care for her own safety which persons of ordinary care and prudence
are accustomed to exercise under the same or similar circumstances.Y5
The appellate court held that this charge was not erroneous even
though there was no mention of a duty to look for trains, and to exer-
cise her senses of sight and hearing so as to detect the approach of
trains. Thus, in this case, the jury was left free to decide, first,
whether persons of ordinary care and prudence usually exercise any
care at railroad crossings when they are automobile passengers. Sec-
ond, the jury, if they found some care was usually exercised, was free
21. Id. at 394-95, 171 N.E. at 861.
22. Id. at 396, 171 N.E. at 861-62, quoting with approval Smith v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 321 Mo. 105, 122, 9 S.W.2d 939, 946 (1928).
23. It should be noted that the duty of the passenger and his right to rely on the driver are
correlatives. That is, the more a passenger has the right to rely upon the driver, the less is it
incumbent upon the passenger to use his own senses to lookout for dangers.
24. Davis v. New York Central R.R, 104 Ohio App. 497, 150 N.E.2d 477 (1957).
25. Id. at 504, 150 N.E.2d at 483. It should be remembered that in this case the decedent
lived only six hundred feet from the crossing.
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to decide what acts constituted due care - to casually glance, look
for puffs of smoke, only look for flashing signals, etc. Finally, the
jury would decide whether the plaintiff failed to meet the standard
of care which they determined a person of ordinary care would have
exercised.
It seems settled now that Ohio is committed to the "liberal"
charge, which leaves the determination of all factors of due care to
the jury and lets it determine whether the passenger-plaintiff failed
to meet this standard.2
FROM WHAT POINT SHOULD CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
BE TESTED
After the decision is made regarding the "strict" versus the "lib-
eral" charge, the following question arises: from what point should
the possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff be tested? That
is, can the plaintiff let herself be put into a position of danger, by not
protesting against excessive speed, failing to see an obstruction, etc.,
and then test the alleged contributory negligence from that point?
Or should the contributory negligence be tested from an earlier point
in time and circumstance, such that the failure to maintain an outlook
or to protest would be included within the acts to be tested by the
jury?
The majority and dissenting opinions in the Bush case27 would
seem to reveal this distinction, even though it was not expressed in
such terms. The majority view was that, since the passenger did not
see the second truck driver waving a flashlight, the passenger was
unaware of a dangerous situation until such time as the accident could
not have been avoided. Therefore, there was no question of contrib-
utory negligence to go to the jury. In effect, the court thus held
that a passenger can let himself be put in a dangerous situation and
then contributory negligence is to be tested from that point. In the
Bush case, since the plaintiff could have done nothing to alter the
26. See Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946); Hocking
Valley Ry. v. Wyle, 122 Ohio St. 391, 171 N.E. 860 (1930); Toledo Ry. & Light Co. v.
Mayers, 93 Ohio St. 304, 112 N.E. 1014 (1916); Yost v. Peterson, 101 Ohio App. 203, 138
N.E.2d 311 (1956); Collins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 76 Ohio App. 115, 63 N.E.2d 225 (1944);
Langdon v. Cincinnati Street Ry., 75 Ohio App. 482, 62 N.E.2d 380 (1943); Johnson v.
Eastern Ohio Transport Corp., 72 Ohio App. 172, 50 N.E.2d 1003 (1942); Metzger v. Yellow
Taxicab Co., 48 Ohio App. 275, 193 N.E. 75 (1933); Bailey v. Parker, 34 Ohio App. 207,
170 N.E. 607 (1930).
27. Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946). The majority
and dissenting opinions' discussions of contributory negligence both appeared to be surprisingly
sound. Upon examination one found that the reason why diametrically opposed results ap-
peared to be equally logical was that each opinion chose a different point to begin their an-
alysis. The problem posed above could be rephrased in terms of the duty of a passenger to
maintain a lookout for dangerous situations which might arise. Both opinions, however,
avoided a head-on discussion of lookout as such.
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course of events after the car passed the second truck driver, no is-
sue of contributory negligence was raised.
The dissenting opinion28 felt that contributory negligence should
be tested from a point prior to the time of imminent collision, and
that the passenger has the duty to use his senses to observe impending
danger at all points along the path to the collision. Therefore, when,
prior to the accident, there was a warning of impending danger, the
jury should decide whether the failure to see this warning, or the fail-
ure to speak to the driver after seeing the warning, constituted con-
tributory negligence. At that point, there was time to avoid the acci-
dent, and the dissenting opinion felt that the jury should pass upon
whether the passenger was negligent in failing to perceive the warn-
ing or to warn the driver of the same.
The same problem was raised in the case of Metzger v. Yellow
Taxicab Co.2" Here the trial court instructed the jury:
It was also the duty of the plaintiff to have exercised ordinary care
for her own safety. It was her duty 'to have used her faculties of sight
and hearing to discover any danger to which she might be exposed and
to have used ordinary care to protect herself therefrom30
In this case, the plaintiff and her husband were guests in the car
driven by a third person. There was an intersection collision with
the defendant, and in a suit for personal injuries the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the case on the basis that there was no evidence that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, because
... the record discloses clearly that Mrs. Metzger [plaintiff] had not
been watching Leith [the driver] or paying attention to how -he was
driving his automobile, there being nothing to attract her attention there-
to until the instant of the occurring collision, when -it was too late for
her to have said or done anything by way of protest or otherwise.3'
Thus, it was the feeling of the court that contributory negligence
should not be tested on a continuing basis. Rather, they said that a
passenger can ignore the driving of her host, be carried into a danger-
ous situation, and then the question of contributory negligence arises
- after the dangerous situation had been created, did the passenger
fail to act as a reasonably cautious person, and would some act have
avoided the injury?
There are a few cases that test the contributory negligence from
the point at which the plaintiff became a passenger, rather than when
the danger was finally made apparent. However, those cases seem
to turn on the fact that the plaintiff assumed a dangerous position
28. Id. at 673, 67 N.E.2d at 859 (dissenting opinion).
29. 48 Ohio App. 275, 193 N.E. 75 (1933).
30. Id. at 276, 193 N.E. at 76.
31. Id. at 277, 193 N.E. at 76.
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in relation to the vehicle. One case3 2 involved a plaintiff riding in
the back of a little open trailer, and another33 dealt with a plaintiff
hitching a ride by standing on a step on a tractor. In each of these
cases, the court said that if the plaintiff puts himself in such a posi-
tion that he cannot effectively use his senses of sight and hearing at
a railroad crossing, there is contributory negligence. Further, the
court held that such negligence is not to be tested from the time at
which it became apparent that a collision was imminent. Again, how-
ever, the cases seem to turn on the initial carelessness of the plaintiff
in assuming his position on the vehicle. 4
Even the assumption of a dangerous position will not always take
the plaintiff outside the rule of testing the contributory negligence
after the danger is upon its victim. A pinnacle of this extreme view
is the case of Collins v. Pennsylvania R. R.3" In that case the plain-
tiff was sitting in the middle of the front seat of a coupe, with three
other persons. The fifteen-year-old plaintiff had ridden in the car
before and knew that the right side window was missing and in its
place was a piece of cardboard with three slots cut in it, covered with
isinglass. The accident took place as the car was crossing a railroad
track, a collision occurring with a train approaching from the right.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of
the plaintiff's case, on the basis that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent by riding in a car with that type window and on the basis
of her testimony that she did not look at all when the car was cross-
ing the railroad track. The court of appeals, in reversing the deci-
sion, said that the question of contributory negligence was for the
jury since reasonable minds could differ on whether the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent by riding in a car from which it was virtually
impossible to see to the right, with four people in the front seat, and
by failing to make any effort to use her senses to perceive possible
danger.
It is a little difficult to reconcile that result with the statement in
the opinion that "guests are required to look and listen at railroad
crossings."3 6  The only way in which this phrase can be reconciled
with the facts of the case is by the court's further statement: "and
of course warn the driver of approaching trains at crossings known to
32. Lawrence v. Toledo Terminal R.R., 154 Ohio St. 335, 96 N.E.2d 7 (1950).
33. Tidd v. New York Central R.R., 132 Ohio St. 531, 9 N.E.2d 509 (1937).
34. The rationale of these cases, that there is a question of contributory negligence because
the plaintiff voluntarily placed himself in a dangerous situation by his physical position, raises
the question of whether there is a truly valid distinction between that type case and the situa-
tion where the plaintiff places himself in a dangerous position by paying no attention to the
road.
35. 76 Ohio App. 115, 63 N.E.2d 225 (1944).
36. Id. at 118, 63 N.E.2d at 228.
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and perceivable by them. .... ,,3 The last phrase, warning the driver
of approaching trains known to the plaintiff, again leaves an out for
the plaintiff and is a further example of testing the contributory neg-
ligence of the plaintiff only from the point after the dangerous situ-
ation has been created, not before.38
PRESUMPTION OF "DUE CARE" AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Having noted that the courts are reluctant to let the issue of con-
tributory negligence go to the jury, that the Ohio courts usually use
the "liberal" rule in their charge when the question is given to the
jury, and that in most cases, contributory negligence is tested from
the point after the emergency situation has been created, the further
obstacles of the burden of proof and presumptions are often insur-
mountably encountered where the defense of contributory negligence
has not yet been eliminated.
There is no question but that the burden of proving contributory
negligence is on the defendant. Further, it is now established in Ohio
that there is a presumption that the passenger acted as a person of
ordinary care and prudence would have acted under the circum-
stances. 9 Remembering that the courts generally hold that the pas-
senger is under the duty to communicate to the driver only those dan-
gers actually perceived by the passenger, a denial on the part of the
plaintiff that he saw the warning or the obstruction, in the absence
of other affirmative evidence, means that the defendant failed to
carry the burden of proof, or that the defendant failed to overcome
the presumption.40 The situation of the defendant becomes especial-
ly difficult in the case where the passenger was killed as a result of
the accident, and is virtually impossible if both the driver and pas-
senger were killed. In such a case, there is no escape for the def end-
ant, so that if any negligence on the part of the defendant can be
found, he is liable.4'
UNWARRANTED DISTINCTIONS IN CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Looking at the role of contributory negligence in the trial of per-
sonal injury suits by passengers, it has been suggested that a distinc-
37. Ibid. Although the word "known" as used in this passage would seem to refer to "cross-
ings," when reading the entire opinion it is apparent that "known" refers to "trains."
38. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Lindahl, 111 Ohio St. 502, 146 N.E. 71 (1924).
39. Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 669-70, 67 N.E.2d 851, 857-58 (1946).
PROSSER, ToRTS 198, n. 59 (2d ed. 1955), states that this presumption is merely another way
of saying that the burden of proof is on the defendant. While this may be correct in legal
theory, the practical effect upon the jury may differ when instructed that "there is a presump-
tion that the plaintiff acted as a person of ordinary care would have acted," rather than being
instructed that "the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant." It
would seem that the former, a "presumption" cloaked with the aura of the bench, would be
more difficult for the defendant to overcome.
40. See Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., supra note 39.
41. Davis v. New York Central K.R., 104 Ohio App. 497, 150 N.E.2d 477 (1957).
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tion seems to exist in the standard of care required of the passenger
depending upon who the defendant is. For example, when the pas-
senger is suing the driver of the vehicle in which he was riding, the
courts have been more willing to use the "strict" rule in charging the
jury as to the duty of the passenger. At the same time, the courts
seem to feel that when the suit is against a third person, the standard
of conduct required of the plaintiff to escape the bar of contributory
negligence should be reduced. And when the defendant happens to
be a railroad, a further drop in the standard is noticed. 42
In legal theory such a distinction is unjustifiable. However, an
unspoken feeling that it is unfair to subject to a lawsuit the driver of
the car in which the plaintiff was riding, when the plaintiff often has
an opportunity to see the danger approaching, seems to be the under-
lying reason for this distinction. To some degree the anomaly has
been extinguished by the guest statute. However, the loop-holes in
this statute are sufficient to provide the court with a number of cases
in which the plaintiff is suing the driver of the vehicle in which he
was a passenger. To the extent that the practice of a double stand-
ard does exist, it seems highly reprehensible since the duty of the pas-
senger is the same - to use ordinary care to protect himself from
injury - regardless of who the defendant may be.
It seems that the courts have been very liberal in determining
what constitutes ordinary care in the railroad cases. It is difficult
to say whether this results from a predisposition as to what result
should be obtained in such a case, a feeling that railroads operate
dangerous instrumentalities so that the court should not be as strict
in defining the duty of the passenger, or the argument that since rail-
road crossings are dangerous a driver is usually more cautious, and
the passenger is, therefore, entitled to rely more heavily upon the
driver in such a case - the correlative being that the passenger's
duty is narrowed. The courts have not made known the basis for
this apparent distinction in railroad crossing cases, but the results of
their decisions seem to bear witness to the fact that it exists. In the
absence of a statute imposing a heavier duty upon a railroad, the dis-
tinction seems unjustified.
Indeed, it would seem that a passenger, even a minor, is aware of
the fact that care must be used in crossing railroad tracks because of
the speed and confined line of travel of trains. If anything, this po-
tential danger area would seem to be apparent to an ordinarily cau-
tious person, thereby suggesting the need for a greater degree of
caution in order to measure up to the standard of the "reasonably
cautious person."
In the same vein, intersections would seem to suggest to an ordi-
narily cautious passenger that he is entering an area of increased
42. Mechem, supra note 19, at 746, n. 18.
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danger, and one in which it is more difficult for the driver to notice
every physical happening. If this is accepted, then it should logically
follow that the passenger should take a more active part as a look-
out, should mention the excessive speed to the driver, and should
warn the driver of cars, other vehicles, or obstructions seen by the
passenger.
Finally, in regard to the varying concept of what constitutes rea-
sonable care on the part of a passenger, consideration must be given
to the "back-seat driver" concept. Looking more closely at the role
of social custom in setting the standard of conduct for the passenger,
there is undoubtedly a feeling that "the average guest will ...feel
constrained to run some risk of loss or damage rather than the risk
of offending the host by interfering or expressing dissatisfaction with
his conduct. ' 43 It is difficult to deny that this is a factor in the jury's
determination of what constitutes reasonable conduct on the part of
the plaintiff. This would seem to be especially true in cases where
the court, using the liberal charge, leaves the entire determination of
the standard of conduct to the jury. One writer, urging the inclusion
of this factor in determining the standard, said:
It is the proper function of the law of negligence to recognize a
standard of conduct that is in harmony with existing social conditions,
which means that all social factors must be weighed in finding that stand-
ard. If this custom or -inhibition -is a factor in the conduct of society, then
its value should not be overlooked in determining what is reasonable
conduct for persons coming under its influence.44
While this custom can hardly be excluded from the jury's con-
sideration in deliberating over the question of contributory negli-
gence, regardless of how strict the instructions may have been, it
would seem that the custom receives undue emphasis when the entire
matter of setting and applying the standard of a reasonably cautious
person is left completely to the jury. If there is no instruction that
a person must use his senses of sight and hearing as a reasonably
cautious person would do under the circumstances, that a passenger
cannot rely entirely upon the driver, or that the plaintiff is not ab-
solved of all duties merely because he is a passenger, then the pri-
mary consideration in testing the standard of conduct required of the
plaintiff would seem to be that of the inhibiting social custom dis-
cussed above, because that custom is what the average person will
usually think of first (or entirely) when questioned as to what con-
duct should be expected of a passenger in a case of excessive speed,
or a car pulling out from a side street.
A further objection to the blind recognition of the custom is that,
by definition, it negates the presumption recognized by the courts
that a passenger used the care of an ordinarily prudent person in
43. Id. at 744.
44. Id. at 744-45.
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order to avoid injury to himself. If "it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that there are certain social customs which are generally ob-
served even at the risk of personal loss,"45 (emphasis added) how
can it be said that there is also a presumption that a person acted as
a reasonably prudent person to protect himself from injury. If the
instinct for self-preservation, which is the basis of the presumption,
is so strong as to allow the courts to indulge in a presumption, how
can it also be said that it is "reasonable conduct" to abstain from act-
ing in a manner calculated to prevent injury, when testing the duty
of the plaintiff-passenger?
It is no answer that the presumption is only to the effect that the
passenger acted in a "reasonably prudent" manner to avoid injury to
himself. It seems neither "reasonable" nor "prudent" for a human
to sit silently by and watch himself be carried into a position of dan-
ger merely because there is an unwritten rule of social etiquette that
it is better to risk the loss of a limb than to offend a driver by sug-
gesting that he not drive eighty miles an hour in a fifty-mile-an-hour
zone. If that be reasonable conduct, on what basis can a person leav-
ing a truck one foot onto the pavement of a highway twenty feet
wide, with a fuzee on the rear end of the truck, be considered unrea-
sonable ?46
TIME TO RE-EXAMINE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Few will argue the point that the defense of contributory negli-
gence is generally held in disfavor by the courts. 47 The primary rea-
son assigned for this attitude is that the doctrine is too harsh, in that
it bars the plaintiff's recovery even though his negligence be slight
compared to that of the defendant. In addition, it is felt in some
quarters that the defendant usually is insured, or is a large corpora-
tion, thereby rendering the defendant better able to bear the burden
of financing the cost of the accident. Regardless of the merits of
these reasons, the fact remains that there exists a nice general rule
of law that has been all but destroyed by the exceptions, interpreta-
tions, and applications of the rule to specific cases. As noted in this
article, many guises used to avoid the application of this defense are
not well founded.
The result of this is that a well established rule of law has been
relegated to playing two minor roles: first, as a bar to recovery in
cases of clear contributory negligence on the part of the passenger ;48
and, second, as an illicit method used by the jury to "compare negli-
gence." It is urged that the defense of contributory negligence does
45. Id. at 744.
46. Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
47. James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 704-05 (1953).
48. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text. Accord, Black v. City of Berea, 137 Ohio
St. 611 (1941).
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